Die Beiträge dieses Buches unternehmen den Versuch, Praktische Philosophie in Begriffen einer negativistischen Sozialphilosophie zu rekonstruieren, die ein breites Spektrum von Phänomenen negativer Sozialität in ihrem eigenen Recht beschreibt und dabei davon ausgehen muss, dass sich diese Phänomene nicht in einer voll integrierten Gemeinschaft oder Gesellschaft aufheben lassen. Eine solche Sozialphilosophie geht den Gründen für die Irreduziblität des Negativen einerseits auf einer begrifflichen Ebene, andererseits aber auch in konkreten historisch-sozialphilosophischen, lexikalisch angeordneten Analysen nach. Getragen sind die Analysen von der Überzeugung, (...) dass ohne „Reibung“ an diesen Phänomenen auch ein Leben im Zeichen des Guten oder Gerechten jeglichen Halt an einem leibhaftigen In-der-Welt-Sein verlieren muss. Wir sind nicht nur unaufhebbarer Negativität ausgesetzt, sondern müssen auch verstehen, wie das der Fall ist, und welche Spielräume des Verhaltens sich uns darin eröffnen. (shrink)

This article describes the place occupied by Edith Stein's philosophy in the early phenomenological movement, in relation to the most important philosophers of this philosophy: Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler, and Martin Heidegger.

The Bologna process forces a reframing of the theological education. In the autor's mind, it affords chances for an improved quality during the first two cycles. The change from an input-oriented to an output-oriented leaming provides a better professional competences. In addition, the Bologna process provokes to profile theology in an interdisciplinary context. The article outlines the profile of Theological Ethics as a self-contained discipline, connectedwith both, the other theolgical disciplines and the adjacent sciences, such as medicine, law, and sociology. (...) According to this, the authors discuss the advantages and the risks ofthe two-cylcle, BA/ma education and draw the conclusions for the further curriculas in theological ethics. A coml)lon competence-based core-curriculum is presented in order to get joint standards and to improve student's mobility. (shrink)

In his later writings Husserl treats ethics as a discipline wherein he transforms it step by step and connects it with a teleological concept. In this process the ethical enquiry into the strivings of the "Vernunft" get integrated into metaphysics. This metaphysics is an ontological teleology to be founded on a transcendental pehenomenology which thematises the absolute facticity of the transcendental subject.

En este artículo, Hans Rainer Sepp estudia el cuadro de El Greco, Laocoonte, pasando desde la descripción puramente formal del cuadro y el análisis simbólico del mismo hasta el análisis fenomenológico del conjunto pictórico. Análisis que reflejará no sólo la realidad de un mundo cambiante que se mueve entre el todo y la nada sino también la presencia del autor dentro del cuadro, creando un mundo aparente, una Troya toledana, que refleja el drama del artista, hostigado por el (...) compromiso ético y la alternativa de la huída. Por ello, tal vez Laocoonte pueda ser visto como la respuesta de El Greco ante el dilema de la obra de arte. In this paper, Hans Rainer Sepp studies El Greco's Laocoon, from the purely formal description and symbolic analysis to the phenomenological analysis of the pictorial whole. Analysis that highlights not only the reality of a changing world that moves between all and nothing, but the author's presence in the picture, creating a seeming world, a Troy-Toledo, and reflecting the drama of the artist, harassed by the ethical commitment and the alternative of the escape. Perhaps Laocoon can be seen as El Greco's answer to the dilemma of art. (shrink)

La «Règle d' Or» , qui est bien connue de la Bible (Tob. 4, 15; Matt. 7, 12; Luc. 6, 31) et qui nous invite à prendre pour critère de notre propre conduite envers autrui les modes d'action que nous (ne) voulons (pas) qu' on envisage envers nous-mêmes, est répandue parmi la plupart des peuples civilisés dès le 5e siècle av. J.-Chr. Elle s'articule principalement de trois façons: 1) comme «règle de sympathie» qui nous engage à (ne pas) imposer à (...) autrui ce que nous (ne) voulons (pas) subir nous-mêmes; 2) comme «règle d'authenticité» qui nous demande de nous en tenir nous-mêmes dans nos actes aux exigences que nous imposons à la conduite d'autrui et que, ce faisant, nous reconnaissons comme universellement valables; 3) comme «règle de réciprocité» qui nous engage à agir nous-mêmes envers autrui comme nous désirons qu'on agisse envers nous. Tout homme revendiquant son corps comme n'appartenant qu' à lui seul, cette règle amène par voie de réciprocité à poser le droit naturel d'un chacun à l'intégrité de son corps, à sa liberté, et à ses biens. (shrink)

The basic thought of Schweitzer's ethic, the reverence for life, has manifold significance. First, it is an appeal to our moral feeling. But secondly, Schweitzer lent this thought also a general, fundamental and therewith philosophical meaning: proceeding from the “most immediate and encompassing fact of consciousness,” described by him with the proposition “I am life that will live in the midst of life that will live,” Schweitzer believed to have found in the idea of reverence for life the fundamental principle (...) of all morality; this consists in the fact “that I experience the need to extend to all wills to live the same reverence that I extend to my own.” In addition to its effect on moral feeling and on ethical theory, the future of the thought, “reverence for life,” also depends on its compliance in the activity of men.The future prospects of the appeal to moral feeling appear good insofar as testimonies from history permit one to assume that the awareness of the reverence for life can be awakened in all men. The ancient Greeks knew such sensibility in theaidos, Goethe in the “reverence for that which is in our midst.” This ever strengthening recognition among the peoples of the earth will, through historically succeeding generations, increasingly eliminate a full disregard for such reverence.Less promising are the prospects of acknowledging the reverence for life as a fundamental principle of morality. On its basis Schweitzer rests his aversion to harming anything living. He does not fail to see thereby that, in order to preserve life, we must destroy some life (at least that of plants). But, says Schweitzer, I become guilty in sacrificing life, and we must constantly remain conscious of this guilt; any attempts at justification, through considerations of differences in the value of various lives, must be rejected.However, an ambiguity in the word “guilt” underlies Schweitzer's position. On the one hand “guilt” is understood as a regrettable cause for the subsistence or eventuation of an evil, on the other as the moral reprehensibility of an attitude. Only the latter represents guilt in a moral sense. Whoever follows the necessity to destroy other, less valuable life in order to preserve his own or another life, assumes guilt only in the second sense. Therefore ethics must raise and pursue the question concerning the value priority of one life over another. This question leads to an encounter with the modern directions of ethics which proceed from the concept of value, and to the continuation of Schweitzer's ethics through this encounter. Schweitzer's explanation that life in the world is “to be brought to its highest value” likewise conduces to the same point, since it necessitates an investigation of the rank order of values.We can note a slow progress of the reverence for life in the private domain of human activity. On the other hand in the interrelationship of peoples there is danger of monstrous mass murder through the atomic bomb. (shrink)

The preceding Preface, which Professor William Frankena had the great kindness to write as an introduction for the readers of the present English translation of my major work, still requires several supplementary com­ ments on my part. Professor Frankena rightly considered it to be an advan­ tage to introduce the English-speaking world to my moral philosophy through its presentation in this book. As an introduction to my moral philosophy, Professor Frankena provided a concise formulation of the fun­ damental ideas of (...) my ethics by quoting from an article I had just recently published. Several points worth mentioning remain. Firstly, it is necessary to distinguish the two editions of the text here translated. The first edition was published in 1951 by Anton Hain in Meisenheim am Glan, under the title Pflicht und Neigung (Duty and In­ clination), with the subtitle Die Grundlagen der Sittlichkeit, erOrtert und neu bestimmt mit besonderem Bezug auf Kant und Schiller (The Fun­ damentals of Morality, Discussed and Redefined with Special Regard to Kant and Schiller). In 1974, a revised and enlarged second edition was published by the same publisher and was entitled Die Grundlagen der Sitt­ Iichkeit (The Fundamentals of Morality). Of this second edition, the first four chapters have been translated in the present volume, along with four more recent essays. (shrink)

Die Studie behandelt die Erfahrung des Raumbildes unter einem doppelten Aspekt. Zum einen wird dieses Erfahren als ein existenziell-leibliches thematisch, zum anderen daraufhin untersucht, inwiefern es lebensweltliche Existenz modifi ziert. Da phänomenologische Forschung früh schon die Nähe von Bildlichkeit und Phänomenalität behauptet hat, gilt es zu fragen, inwiefern nicht nur die theoretische Erfassung des Phänomenalen eine phänomenologische Epoché erfordert, sondern bereits das Erleben von Bildern im Raum genuine Weisen der Abstandnahme von durchschnittlichen Weisen, in der Welt zu sein, impliziert.

The central thesis of this article is that film is directing and directed kinaesthesis understood as an opening of world beyond the relation of “subjective” and “objective”. Thus the analysis does not focus on the recipients of a movie but on the origins filming finds in specific ways of experiencing, that is, in the living bodies of the persons who decide on the perspective of a take by using the camera’s body. Moved by its filmmakers, the body of the camera (...) is directed as the product of its authors, and is directing insofar as it establishes a world by its own means. The article explains basic forms of opening world by kinaesthetic processes in general, and applies this investigation to the corpus of film. Finally, the results of these analyses will be put in concrete terms by relating them to basic film features and a few samples of movies. (shrink)

En un ensayo de 2002 Julia Iribarne somete a crítica algunas teorías fenomenológicas sobre el sueño, agregando algunas descripciones de los fenómenos. En este ensayo se evaluará de modo crítico la contribución de Iribarne. En el primer apartado se esbozarán brevemente las principales conclusiones de una fenomenología del sueño tal fueron formuladas desde Husserl a Th. Conrad. En el segundo se contrastará con ellas la crítica de J. Iribarne. En el tercero se examinarán la solidez de sus objeciones antes de (...) intentar, en el último apartado, desde la pregunta central sobre la producción de la realidad en un sueño, formular un resultado que lleva un poco más lejos, pero que igualmente solo puede ser provisional.In a 2002 essay, Julia Iribarne subjected to criticism some phenomenological theories on sleep, adding some descriptions of phenomena. This essay critically evaluates the contribution of Iribarne. In the first section, it briefly outlines the main conclusions of a phenomenology of sleep that were made from Husserl to Th. Conrad. The second, it contrasts these theories with Iribarne's criticism. The third part examines the strength of their objections, before attempting to formulate, in the fourth and final section, from the central question about the production of reality in a sleep, a result that takes a little further, but it also can only be provisional. (shrink)

Is there an anthropological difference within the basic style by which human beings exist ‘in’ world? The central problem of Gregor Samsa’s metamorphosis and the specific status of his animality can be focused by this question. Perhaps this difference manifests itself only when the human being has become estranged from any normal relation to world: when it has been changed into a shape of subjectivity that no longer shares the common net of a world of sense, and remains only an (...) ‘animal.’ The moment is tragic in that the attempt to live an alternative style of worldly being results in the ‘animalyzed’ subject’s condemnation to death. (shrink)